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PREFACE BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRE OF GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
It gives me great pleasure to see the publication of this important report by CGHR. The Centre 
has a strong commitment to interdisciplinary research that impacts upon policy and practice, 
and this report – and the wider engagement with stakeholders that it led to – is exactly the kind 
of work we pride ourselves in doing well.  
Our work with the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, 
Professor Christof Heyns, over the past four years represents the Centre’s most long-standing 
initiative in policy-collaboration. The project is linked with an academic partnership with the 
University of Pretoria, generously supported by the David and Elaine Potter Foundation. 
I want to pay particular tribute to the report’s author, Dr Ella McPherson, and to Dr Thomas 
Probert – the two CGHR Research Associates who ran this project. They led a CGHR Research 
Team including both undergraduates and post-graduate students across three different 
departments, who made an excellent contribution to the research and created a valuable digital 
resource for practitioners and researchers working in this field. 
This report arises out of a growing interest of the mandate led by Professor Heyns to examine 
the possibilities of new technology – or new ways of using old technology – to better support the 
protection of and accountability for the right to life. Given that the norms concerning the right to 
life have broadly been settled, much of the controversy around the mandate tends to concern 
facts rather than debates about what should happen. States are not prone to claim the right to 
kill unlawfully – they rather deny being involved in such practices. This places a premium on 
questions of fact-finding and evidence, a focus of this report. 
The importance of examining the use of Information and Communication Technologies in human 
rights practice is evident. The relative ease of digital communications provides great affordances 
to those involved in witnessing, monitoring, and documenting rights abuses.  ICTs can support 
their efforts to advocate, warn, and report to others within and beyond the human rights world, 
including media and governance actors. Yet these affordances come with risks and challenges. 
Judging the quality and veracity of information transmitted, managing overwhelming data flows, 
preventing or reducing vulnerabilities and threats faced by human rights defenders, navigating 
media wars in which political actors seek to distort public debate to their advantage – these and 
related concerns take on new and different dimensions in a digital age. 
Looking beyond this report and our work for the Special Rapporteur, the Centre of Governance 
and Human Rights is working on a multitude of issues concerning Human Rights in the Digital 
Age. One area of particular interest is pluralism, namely how to maintain and foster diversity of 
perspectives, especially from the least heard, in human rights practice. The same technologies 
that expand possibilities of communication may lead human rights actors, state and non-state 
alike, to restrict access to important platforms and spaces of debate and discussion because of 
the challenges they face. CGHR is well placed to work with policymakers and practitioners to 
examine this important issue, and others, in the coming years. 
 
        
Dr Sharath Srinivasan  
 
Director, Centre of Governance and Human Rights  
University of Cambridge  
  
  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) is creating a wealth 
of new opportunities as well as a variety of new risks for human rights practice.  
Given the pace of innovation in the development and use of ICTs, our understanding 
of their impact on human rights lags.  This report provides a crucial and in depth look 
at ICT initiatives and trends across the key human rights practices of prevention, 
fact-finding, and advocacy, identifying both risks and opportunities.   
In prevention, ICTs can be harnessed to protect human rights defenders, to prevent 
violations in police-civilian interactions, and in data-driven early warning systems 
and communication-based conflict prevention.  That said, ICTs also create new 
security risks for human rights defenders and can violate the right to privacy. 
In fact-finding, ICTs afford the spontaneous and solicited participation of civilian 
witnesses in the production of human rights evidence.  Of course, a greater volume 
and variety of information from unknown and untrained sources creates problems of 
misinformation and verification, which technology only goes so far to mitigate. 
In advocacy, ICTs provide new channels for quickly and visibly mobilizing publics, for 
directly engaging with advocacy targets, and for spreading awareness of human 
rights.  That said, the effects of these new advocacy channels are unclear, and they 
may imperil categories of human rights and the reputations of human rights 
organizations. 
The report also considers how digital divides and the political economy of ICTs 
influence the nature, extent, and distribution of these opportunities and risks.  In 
doing so, it outlines a research framework for understanding ICTs and human rights 
practice to underpin academics’ and practitioners’ assessment, development, and 
deployment of ICTs for and in the spirit of human rights. 
An earlier version of this report, prepared for an expert meeting ahead of the June 
2015 session of the UN Human Rights Council, informed the thematic report on ICTs 
and the right to life presented at that session by the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions.  As such, the projects profiled 
represent a snapshot of that timeframe; this report is therefore accompanied by a 
regularly updated, student-run Tumblr blog, ictandhr.tumblr.com, which welcomes 
submissions on new initiatives.  
 
  
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 1 
ICTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE OF PREVENTION ............................................ 3 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS ............................................................................................. 3 
POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS ...................................................................................................................... 7 
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS .......................................................................... 9 
ICTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE OF FACT-FINDING ........................................12 
DIGITAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING BY CIVILIAN WITNESSES ............................................................. 13 
Spontaneous reports from civilian witnesses .................................................................................. 14 
Solicited reports from civilian witnesses: crowdsourcing and crowdseeding ................. 16 
FACT-FINDERS’ EVALUATION OF CIVILIAN WITNESS INFORMATION FOR EVIDENCE .......................... 17 
Addressing the security challenge ........................................................................................................ 18 
Addressing the volume challenge ......................................................................................................... 19 
Addressing the verification challenge ................................................................................................. 20 
ICTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE OF ADVOCACY ...............................................27 
PUBLIC MOBILIZATION ................................................................................................................................. 28 
DIRECT TARGETING....................................................................................................................................... 30 
HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION ....................................................................................................................... 32 
CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR APPROACHING ICTS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICE ..........................................................................................................................34 
ICTS AND DIGITAL DIVIDES ......................................................................................................................... 34 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ICTS ............................................................................................................ 36 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................40 
 
 
 
 
  
ICTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 
A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY, OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS 
BY ELLA MCPHERSON 
 
ICTs and Human Rights Practice: Introduction 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION1 
In 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
executions, Christof Heyns, received a horrifying video from the UK’s Channel 4 that 
seemed to document the summary execution of Tamil prisoners by Sri Lankan 
soldiers.  This anonymous video, shot on a mobile phone, was an extended version 
of a video that Heyns’ predecessor, Philip Alston, had previously evaluated.  If true, 
the video would be evidence of a grave violation of the right to life – evidence that 
could not have existed prior to the advent of video-enabled mobile phones. 
After receiving the first, shorter version of the video, Alston wrote the Sri Lankan 
government indicating that the footage warranted an independent investigation.  In 
response, the Sri Lankan government claimed the video had been fabricated, citing 
analysis it commissioned from audio, video, ballistics, and forensic pathology 
experts.  In turn, Alston also engaged experts, who instead found that the contents 
of the video indicated authenticity.  Heyns gave the extended video to the same 
experts for review; by examining the footage for indications of editing and the 
details of the incidents recorded, these experts again concluded that the video 
depicted real executions.  Heyns then reported these findings to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council, calling on the Sri Lankan Government to investigate the 
executions.2 
This pioneering case, which demonstrated both the potential of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) for expanding the documentation of human 
rights violations and the problem of verification this expansion poses, was an 
impetus for this report.3  ICTs are unsettling human rights practices across the board, 
including the key practices of preventing human rights violations, fact-finding cases 
of violations, and advocating for the amelioration of individual cases as well as for 
the promotion of a broader culture of human rights.4  Given the pace of innovation 
in the development and use of ICTs, our understanding of their impact on human 
rights often lags.  Understanding this impact is crucial not just because of the 
opportunities ICTs create for human rights – which we can think of as affordances, or 
                                                     
1 I am grateful for insightful comments on the document from Anne Alexander, Richard Danbury, Christof Heyns, 
Finbarr Livesey, Lucy Purdon, Thomas Probert, Sharath Srinivasan, and the participants in the Expert Meeting.  
Any errors, of course, remain my own. 
2 Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Christof 
Heyns: Addendum, Human Rights Council 17th Session (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 27 May 2011) <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Executions/A-HRC-17-28-Add1.pdf>. 
3 Given the Special Rapporteur’s mandate, the report was originally tailored to human rights work related to the 
right to life, though much of its content holds for the full array of rights.   
4 Sameer Padania and others, Cameras Everywhere: Current Challenges and Opportunities at the Intersection of 
Human Rights, Video and Technology (Brooklyn, NY: Witness, 2011) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Communications/Witness_1.pdf>. 
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2 
what ICTs allow their users to do.5  It is also crucial – due to the ‘double-edged’ 
nature of technology – because of the risks.6  
Information and communication technology is a catchall category that refers to the 
hardware and software that facilitate the production, storage, transmission, and 
reception of digital information.7  The aim of this report, targeted at both 
practitioners and researchers, is to provide a snapshot of current initiatives and 
trends at the intersection of ICTs and human rights practices.  Based on a review of 
primary materials documenting these initiatives and trends as well as on interviews 
with human rights defenders (HRDs), this report examines three key human rights 
practices in turn. 
In prevention, the use of ICTs includes their deployment to protect HRDs, to deter 
violations through police body-worn cameras, and for conflict prevention and early 
warning systems.  These three uses address hotspots of right to life violations.  They 
also create new security and privacy risks.  
In fact-finding, ICTs support both spontaneous and solicited civilian witnessing.  ICTs 
facilitate fact-finders’ evaluation of human rights information for evidence – but they 
also complicate it because of the volume and verification challenges of social media 
information.  Although generating robust evidence is a requirement of all human 
rights fact-finding, it is particularly relevant for cases involving the violation of the 
right to life, as one of the major challenges in this area is perpetrators’ refutation of 
allegations of violations.   
In terms of advocacy, ICTs provide new opportunities for reaching publics and 
advocacy targets.  Because of social media’s particular characteristics and cultures, 
however, their use may jeopardize the visibility of particular categories of human 
rights information as well as the reputations of human rights organizations.    
Looking at opportunities and risks for human rights practices in the field is key for 
understanding how using ICTs can impact work to secure the right to life and other 
human rights.  These opportunities and risks are not, however, distributed evenly.  
Their distribution is inflected by digital divides with respect to access to ICTs as well 
as with respect to digital literacy, or knowledge about how to use ICTs.  These digital 
divides, as well as the nature of the opportunities and risks that the use of ICTs 
generates, are in turn influenced by ICTs’ political economy, namely the power 
relations in which the use of particular ICTs are embedded.  The conclusion of this 
report recommends that academics and practitioners take an approach to 
understanding ICTs and human rights practice that encompasses these aspects as a 
way to foreground the human rights concerns of redressing power abuses and 
enabling pluralism in the research, design, and deployment of these ICTs. 
                                                     
5 Jeffrey W. Treem and Paul M. Leonardi, ‘Social Media Use in Organizations: Exploring the Affordances of 
Visibility, Editability, Persistence, and Association’, Communication Yearbook, 36 (2012), 143–89. 
6 Emma Daly, ‘Why Tech Is a Double-Edged Sword for Human Rights’, Human Rights Watch, 6 January 2014 
<www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/06/why-tech-double-edged-sword-human-rights>. 
7 David J. McKenzie, Youth, ICTs, and Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/03/7458887/youth-icts-development>. 
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ICTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE OF PREVENTION 
ICTs support the human rights practice of the prevention of violations in a variety of 
ways, three of which are addressed here.  The first is the physical and digital 
protection of HRDs.  A second category is the deterrence of violations committed by 
police through the deployment of body-worn cameras.  Third are early warning 
systems and conflict prevention initiatives designed to detect and defuse imminent 
human rights violations and conflict more broadly.     
Of course, these applications all have their risks and shortcomings.  For example, the 
same affordances of digital technology that allow HRDs to alert their networks that 
they are facing imminent danger – namely geolocation and networked 
communications – make it easier for those targeting HRDs to identify, surveille, and 
harass them.8  Easy documentation with digital video cameras may prevent police 
abuses, but it may also engender violations of the right to privacy.9  Though the 
reach and analytic capabilities of ICTs demonstrate potential for the remote 
identification of potential human rights hotspots at unprecedented scale and speed, 
this is not yet translatable into swift action on the ground.10   
Protection of human rights defenders      
Front Line Defenders documented 130 cases of HRDs dying in detention or being 
killed between January and October of 2014, part of a ‘growing global backlash.’11  
HRDs’ increasing use of ICTs to communicate, organize, investigate, and advocate 
facilitates this backlash.  For example, HRDs may inadvertently expose their 
identities and locations – as well as those of their professional and personal 
networks – or they may unknowingly fall prey to surveillance.  This section first 
overviews a number of the risks for HRDs that are exacerbated by their use of ICTs, 
and then outlines initiatives to protect them physically as well as digitally. 
HRDs’ physical security is closely linked to their digital security, and the use of ICTs 
makes HRDs vulnerable to attacks on both.  These attacks are unfortunately part of 
pattern, and digital attacks in particular build on a history of information wars 
between HRDs and those seeking retaliation for their work.12  These digital attacks 
can be manifested in deception, intimidation, discrediting, censorship, and 
surveillance.  Recent examples include websites that tricked Syrian activists into 
downloading malware by purporting to provide security tools; the abduction of a 
                                                     
8 Stephanie Hankey and Daniel Ó Clunaigh, ‘Rethinking Risk and Security of Human Rights Defenders in the Digital 
Age’, Journal of Human Rights Practice, 5 (2013), 535–47 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/hut023>. 
9 Robert Muggah, ‘Why Police Body Cameras Are Taking Off, Even After Eric Garner’s Death’, IPI Global 
Observatory, 11 December 2014 <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/12/police-body-cameras-eric-garner/>. 
10 Sheldon Himelfarb, ‘Can Big Data Stop Wars Before They Happen?’, United States Institute of Peace, 2014 
<www.usip.org/publications/can-big-data-stop-wars-they-happen>. 
11 Front Line Defenders, Front Line Defenders Annual Report 2015: Human Rights Defenders in the Balance (Front 
Line Defenders, 13 January 2015) <www.frontlinedefenders.org/2015-Annual-Report>. 
12 Front Line Defenders; Hankey and Clunaigh. 
CGHR, 2015 
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Libyan HRD shortly after he received a threatening message on Facebook; and the 
UK government’s surveillance of Amnesty International’s electronic 
communications.13  Across the globe, state censorship and surveillance of the 
internet have proliferated year on year since Freedom House began tracking it in 
2010, and arrests related to internet use are increasing worldwide.14     
The risks associated with HRDs’ use of ICTs are evolving in tandem with the 
technology.  For example, face recognition algorithms are increasingly accurate – 
and indeed are moving beyond face recognition to matching identities with other 
idiosyncratic physical characteristics like posture and hairstyle.15  Results can then be 
cross-referenced with other data such as Facebook profiles.16  The human rights 
community is often at a disadvantage versus states in the technological ‘arms race,’ 
which requires resources like time, money, and expertise.  Furthermore, states have 
a distinct source of leverage over technology companies, in that they can threaten to 
ban their websites; this leverage may compel companies to hand over user 
information.17  
That being said, initiatives are underway to use technology to protect HRDs 
physically and to equip HRDs to protect themselves digitally.  In terms of the former, 
various organizations are developing alert applications that activists, journalists, and 
others can use to send a signal that they are in danger.  These applications, such as 
Amnesty International’s Panic Button, build on the increasing ubiquity of 
smartphones.  Another example is commercial operator PFO tech’s GPS bracelets, 
developed as part of the Civil Rights Defenders’ Natalia Project for human rights 
practitioners operating in risky situations.  Once triggered, the bracelet sends an 
alarm and position alert to nearby contacts and the headquarters of Civil Rights 
Defenders, which then sends an alert out to its social media followers.  According to 
                                                     
13 Sherif Elsayed-Ali, ‘The UK Government Spied on Us and We Won’t Take It Lying Down’, Amnesty International, 
2 July 2015 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/07/the-uk-government-spied-on-us-and-we-wont-
take-it-lying-down/>; John Scott-Railton and Morgan Marquis-Boire, ‘A Call to Harm: New Malware Attacks 
Target the Syrian Opposition’, The Citizen Lab, 21 June 2013 <https://citizenlab.org/2013/06/a-call-to-harm/>; 
United Nations Human Rights, ‘UN Rights Chief Zeid Condemns Attacks on Human Rights Defenders in Libya’, 
United Nations Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 14 October 2014 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15168>. 
14 Sanja Kelly and others, Tightening the Net: Governments Expand Online Controls (Freedom House, 2014) 
<www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2014/tightening-net-governments>; Andrew Robertson and 
Steve Olson, Sensing and Shaping Emerging Conflicts: Report of a Workshop by the National Academy of 
Engineering and United States Institute of Peace Roundtable on Technology, Science, and Peacebuilding 
(Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2013) 
<http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Sensing_And_Shaping_Emerging_Conflicts.pdf>. 
15 Aviva Rutkin, ‘Facebook Can Recognise You in Photos Even If You’re Not Looking’, New Scientist, 22 June 2015 
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn27761-facebook-can-recognise-you-in-photos-even-if-youre-not-
looking>. 
16 Sameer Padania, ‘The Ethics of Face Recognition Technology’, WITNESS Blog, 7 March 2012 
<http://blog.witness.org/2012/03/the-ethics-of-face-recognition-technology/>; Natasha Singer, ‘Never 
Forgetting a Face’, The New York Times, 17 May 2014 <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/technology/never-
forgetting-a-face.html>. 
17 Hankey and Clunaigh; Paul Vale, ‘Russia Threatens To Block Facebook, Google And Twitter’, The Huffington 
Post UK, 22 May 2015 <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/05/22/russia-threatens-to-ban-facebook-google-
and-twitter-unless-companies-turn-over-user-data_n_7423550.html>. 
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the organization’s executive director, the idea is that a HRD wearing the bracelet 
would have ‘millions of people around the world on [her] wrist.’18   
Technological tools for computer security are increasingly vital to HRDs’ safety.  
These include tools for encryption, namely the mathematical manipulation of 
information to render it readable solely by 
the person intended to receive it, and tools 
for anonymity, the successful concealment of 
one’s identity.  As the Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of expression and opinion recently 
reported to the UN Human Rights Council, 
encryption and anonymity are also vital to our 
exercise of the human rights within his 
mandate.21     
For example, non-profit The Tor Project has 
developed Tor, communication software that 
routes data packets through a number of 
computers, thus disconnecting source and 
destination.22  As such, Tor facilitates 
anonymity, which affords the formation of 
opinion by allowing users to freely search and 
research online.23  Detekt, developed via a 
partnership between Amnesty International, 
Digitale Gesellschaft, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and Privacy International, allows 
individuals to scan their computers for 
spyware designed to circumnavigate 
encryption.24  
Just because these physical and digital security tools exist, however, does not mean 
they are at HRDs’ fingertips.25  First of all, governments are enacting or considering 
                                                     
18 Nina Strochlic, ‘Can This Bracelet Save Your Life’, PFO Tech, n.d. <http://www.pfotech.com/2013/04/06/can-
bracelet-save-life-newsweek/>. 
19 Tanya O’Carroll, ‘More than an App: The Panic Button, One Year on’, Amnesty International, 22 July 2015 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/07/panic-button-one-year-on/>. 
20 Tom Watson, ‘Inside Amnesty’s Panic Button App: Simple Technology, Serious Impact For Activists’, Forbes, 23 
June 2014 <http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomwatson/2014/06/23/inside-amnestys-panic-button-app-simple-
technology-serious-impact-for-activists/>. 
21 David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, David Kaye, Human Rights Council 29th Session (United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 22 May 2015) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/CallForSubmission.aspx>. 
22 Tor, ‘Tor: Overview’, Tor, n.d. <https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en>. 
23 Kaye. 
24 Detekt, ‘Intentions and Methods’, Detekt: Resist Surveillance, n.d. 
<https://resistsurveillance.org/intentions.html>. 
Amnesty International’s Panic Button 
The Panic Button app allows users to 
secretly activate SMS messages containing 
an alarm message and, optionally, 
geolocation data. These messages are sent 
to three pre-selected peers through rapidly 
pressing the mobile phone’s power button.  
When HRDs or journalists are attacked or 
arrested, they are usually forced to 
relinquish their phones for the lists of 
contacts they store.  As long as Panic 
Button, which is disguised as a mundane 
app, is not discovered on the phone, and as 
long as the phone is still on and within 
range, it will continue to broadcast alerts. 
These alerts are not only calls for help but 
also indicate to recipients that they should 
take security precautions themselves.  
Activists testing the Panic Button app have 
reported that the process has prompted 
them to strengthen their overall security 
plans.19  Amnesty developed the Panic 
Button Android app in collaboration with 
iilab, the engine room, and Front Line 
Defenders; funders include the Ford 
Foundation and Google.20 
CGHR, 2015 
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limits to online encryption and anonymity.  For example, South Korea requires users 
to register with their real names when they access certain online spaces.26  In 
Ethiopia, a number of bloggers who wrote about human rights were arrested for 
treason, and their use of Security-in-a-Box, a digital security resource, was presented 
as evidence against them.27  The UK government has recently revived arguments for 
backdoors built into encryption to allow the government to read communications 
encrypted by that technology.  This argument has resurfaced despite security 
experts’ assertion that these backdoors are operationally and technically 
infeasible.28  
Second, as the famous experiment titled, ‘Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt,’ demonstrates, 
a gap can exist between the language of programmers creating these tools and the 
literacy of users.  Two-thirds of this experiment’s relatively well-educated test 
subjects could not ascertain how to encrypt and sign an email using PGP 5.0, even 
though they had full access to the PGP manual and ninety minutes to try.29  Digital 
literacy, as a new element of the human rights toolkit, presents a steep learning 
curve, and HRDs are often already very pressed for time and resources.30  This lack of 
digital literacy on security is a problem across the board for HRDs, from NGOs to the 
UN Human Rights Council, where, for example, several mechanisms solicit reports of 
human rights violations over email without indicating attendant risks or strategies 
for more secure communications.31 
ICTs for physical and digital security can be useless or even dangerous without 
adequate training.  For example, personal security apps may embolden human rights 
practitioners to take excessive risks if they do not anticipate that these apps only 
work in areas with mobile coverage and plan accordingly.32  As Neu writes, ‘Sooner 
                                                                                                                                                        
25 For more on these themes, see the summary of a recent workshop co-hosted by CGHR and Amnesty 
International: Rebekah Larsen and Ella McPherson, ‘Encryption, Anonymity & Human Rights Workshop’, Centre of 
Governance and Human Rights, University of Cambridge, 2015 <http://www.cghr.polis.cam.ac.uk/research-
themes/human-rights-in-the-digital-age-1/encryption-and-human-rights-workshop>. 
26 Anna Crowe, Sarah Lee and Mark Verstraete, Securing Safe Spaces Online: Encryption, Anonymity, and Human 
Rights (Privacy International, 2015) 
<https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/Securing%20Safe%20Spaces%20Online_0.pdf>. 
27 Front Line Defenders. 
28 Harold Abelson and others, Keys Under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity by Requiring Government Access to All 
Data and Communications, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Technical Report, 6 July 2015 
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/doormats.pdf>. 
29 Alma Whitten and J. D. Tygar, ‘Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0’, in Security and 
Usability: Designing Secure Systems That People Can Use, ed. by Lorrie Cranor and Garfinkel Simson (Sebastopol, 
CA: O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2005), pp. 679–702. 
30 Hankey and Clunaigh. 
31 Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Christof 
Heyns: Use of Information and Communications Technologies to Secure the Right to Life, Human Rights Council 
29th Session (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 April 2015) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf>. 
32 Cynthia Romero, What Next? The Quest to Protect Journalists and Human Rights Defenders in a Digital World 
(USAID, 2014) <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/What%27s%20Next%20-
%20The%20Quest%20to%20Protect%20Journalists%20and%20Human%20Rights%20Defenders%20in%20a%20Di
gital%20World.pdf>. 
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or later, all technology problems become education problems.’33  Consequently, a 
number of online digital literacy resources targeted at HRDs exist.  These include the 
aforementioned Security-in-a-Box, developed by the Tactical Technology Collective 
and Front Line Defenders, as well as the digital security helpline provided by Access, 
an NGO focused on digital rights.34  Another NGO, New Tactics in Human Rights, 
creates spaces for online knowledge exchange between HRDs on aspects of human 
rights practice, including digital security.35   
Developers and trainers tend to caution users not to ever expect full privacy and 
anonymity online.  Panic Button, for example, warns, ‘It is important to start with the 
understanding that mobile phones are inherently insecure,’ both in their storage and 
transmission of information and because smartphones, by default, share information 
about their usage and locations.36  This risk has impelled some HRDs to conduct their 
work entirely offline.  Others are highly public about their identities and their 
activities online, based on the belief that publicity can provide protection.  Some 
activists in China, for example, reported pretending to film after their phones ran out 
of batteries as a shield against abduction or arrest.37  This use of technology, where 
digital documentation is an intended deterrent, also underpins the use of police 
body-worn cameras. 
Police body-worn cameras         
Calls for greater police accountability have amplified in the wake of several recent 
police shootings in the United States, including the killing of teenager Michael Brown 
in Ferguson, Missouri.  The number of individuals killed by law enforcement in the 
U.S. is unknown, as the government does not collect this figure.  Annual estimates 
range from approximately 400 ‘justifiable police homicides,’ as reported by police 
officers, to between 600 and 1,000, as estimated by journalists and civilian 
investigators.38  A high salience idea in current debates about police violence – and 
the subject of a recent $236m investment by the U.S. government – is the police use 
of wearable technology in the form of body-worn cameras.39  This idea operates on 
the assumption that filming police interactions with civilians will check abuses as 
well as provide evidence should accusations of misconduct be levied against either 
                                                     
33 Christopher Neu, ‘Mobile Applications for Atrocity Prevention Require Mobile Students’, TechChange, 2013 
<http://techchange.org/2013/02/19/mobile-applications-for-atrocity-prevention-require-mobile-students/>. 
34 Access, ‘Access Tech’, Access <https://www.accessnow.org/pages/tech#Digital%20Security%20Helpline>. 
35 New Tactics in Human Rights, ‘Staying Safe: Security Resources for Human Rights Defenders’, New Tactics in 
Human Rights, 2010 <https://www.newtactics.org/conversation/staying-safe-security-resources-human-rights-
defenders>. 
36 Panic Button, ‘Managing Your Risks’, Panic Button, n.d. <https://panicbutton.io/help/help-risk.html>. 
37 Hankey and Clunaigh. 
38 Annie Waldman, ‘Death by Cop: Invisible Numbers’, BBC News, 27 August 2014 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-echochambers-28946204>. 
39 Muggah. 
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police or civilians.40  Indeed, a study of police in Rialto, California found that officers’ 
use of force dropped by 59% upon the introduction of body-worn cameras.41 
The institutionalization of these cameras may 
be an even greater deterrent of abuses than 
smartphone-enabled civilian witnessing of 
incidents, such as the 2014 death of Eric 
Garner following a chokehold by a New York 
City Police Department officer and filmed by a 
bystander.  This is because institutionalized 
use, which requires police to warn civilians 
that they are recording, creates ‘cognition of 
surveillance’ among both police and civilians, 
potentially moderating behaviour.44  
Police around the world, including the New 
York City Police Department, the Jamaica 
Constabulary Force, and the London Metropolitan Police, are trialling versions of 
police body-worn cameras.  A police department in the U.S. state of Georgia, for 
example, uses Google Glass to record interactions with civilians, and the recordings 
are transmitted real-time back to the police station for monitoring.45  In another 
example, the police in Calgary, Canada, plan to layer on face-recognition software to 
analyse the footage collected by their cameras.46   
As much as these programmes are generating interest, they are also generating 
concerns, particularly around possible violations of the right to privacy.  Some have 
suggested that the cameras be turned off upon entering a home or when speaking 
with survivors of sexual assaults and minors.  Given the potentially sensitive nature 
of this footage, access to information and the security of its storage must be a 
consideration.47  A separate concern is selective documentation; a suggested remedy 
                                                     
40 Josh Sanburn, ‘Police Eye Google Glass as Surveillance Tool’, Time, 17 February 2014 
<http://nation.time.com/2014/02/17/police-eye-google-glass-as-surveillance-tool/>. 
41 Fred Lewsey, ‘First Scientific Report Shows Police Body-Worn-Cameras Can Prevent Unacceptable Use-of-
Force’, University of Cambridge, 23 December 2014 <http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/first-scientific-
report-shows-police-body-worn-cameras-can-prevent-unacceptable-use-of-force>. 
42 Amar Toor, ‘Camera Cops: Digital Spying in Rio’s Most Dangerous Slums’, The Verge, 21 October 2013 
<http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/21/4861176/smart-policing-android-app-igarape-google-ideas-police-
surveillance-rio-favelas>. 
43 Igarapé Institute, ‘Smart Policing’, Igarapé Institute: Progressive Alternatives for Security and Development, n.d. 
<en.igarape.org.br/smart-policing/>. 
44 Lewsey. 
45 Sanburn. 
46 BBC News, ‘Met Officers to Trial Body Cameras’, BBC News London, 8 May 2014 <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-london-27313500>; John Lorinc, ‘New Era of Policing: Will the Benefits of Body-Worn Cameras Outweigh 
the Privacy Issues?’, The Globe and Mail, 21 November 2014 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/new-era-of-policing-will-the-benefits-of-body-worn-cameras-
outweigh-the-privacy-issues/article21698547/>; Alphea Saunders, ‘Body Cameras for Policemen’, Jamaica 
Information Service, 2014 <http://jis.gov.jm/body-cameras-policemen/>. 
47 Bracken Stockley, ‘Public Support for Police Body Cameras – but Who Controls On/off Switch?’, The Justice 
Gap, 2014 <http://thejusticegap.com/2014/03/body-worn-video-cameras-scrutiny/>. 
CopCast 
A cornerstone of the Igarapé Institute’s 
Smart Policing programme is CopCast, 
open-source software that allows 
smartphones to be used as body-worn 
cameras transmitting video, audio, and 
geolocation coordinates from officers on 
patrol back to headquarters.42  Police are 
currently testing it in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; 
Nairobi, Kenya; and Cape Town, South 
Africa.43  Igarapé is developing the 
programme in partnership with the African 
Policing and Civilian Oversight Forum and 
with support from Google. 
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is stipulating that individual police officers have no control over when the camera is 
filming or how footage is edited.48  Another remedy, being promoted in particular by 
activists in the U.S., is raising awareness of civilians’ right to record back.49  Despite 
these limitations, the hope is that police body-worn cameras can serve as a conflict 
prevention mechanism. 
Conflict prevention and early warning systems    
Actors are deploying ICTs for prevention through mitigation and through prediction 
in hotspots of potential human rights violations and broader conflict.  Examples of 
conflict prevention rest on ICTs’ communication affordances.  Tactics include the 
diffusion of peace-promoting messages, as with PeaceTXT in Kenya, and the 
screening of communications for hate speech, as mobile network operator 
Safaricom did during the 2013 Kenyan election.50  Another approach is livestreaming 
situations that threaten individuals’ human rights as they unfold.  This ‘co-presence 
for good’ relies on livestreaming video apps, such as Twitter’s Periscope, in 
combination with smartphones or wearable cameras such as Google Glass and 
potentially also with virtual reality technology so that audiences can experience 
‘being there’ in real-time.51  These audiences can include experts, such as lawyers, 
conducting live analysis of the situation and feeding it back to the person on the 
ground.52  In a sense, co-presence collapses the categories of prevention, fact-
finding, and advocacy.  Knowledge of the co-presence of others may stymie 
violations, while these others are witnesses and a natural advocacy group if a 
violation does take place.  Of course, co-presence also creates risks due, for example, 
to the impossibility of editing out subjects who request anonymity or are in danger.53 
The affordances of ICTs for the rapid and widespread collection, analysis, and 
communication of information undergird early warning systems.  Aymta, an early 
warning system for scud missiles in Syria, was one such example – though it is now 
defunct in part due to a lack of funding, a common problem for ‘peacetech’ 
                                                     
48 Sanburn. 
49 Nadia Kayyali, ‘Want to Record The Cops? Know Your Rights’, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2015 
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/want-record-cops-know-your-rights>. 
50 Sonni Efron, ‘Meet the Hacktivist Who Wants to Warn Syrians About Incoming Missiles’, The Atlantic, 2 July 
2013 <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/meet-the-hacktivist-who-wants-to-warn-syrians-
about-incoming-missiles/277461/>; Sheldon Himelfarb and Anand Varghese, ‘Peace, Inc.’, Foreign Policy, 2015 
<foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/27/peace-inc-tech-government-industry-defense-funding/>; Patrick Meier, 
‘PeaceTXT Kenya: Since Wars Begin in the Minds of Men’, PopTech, 4 March 2013 
<http://poptech.org/blog/peacetxt_kenya_since_wars_begin_in_the_minds_of_men>; Lucy Purdon, Corporate 
Responses to Hate Speech in the 2013 Kenya Presidential Elections, Case Study: Safaricom (Institute for Human 
Rights and Business, 2013) <http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/DD-Safaricom-Case-Study.pdf>. 
51 Sam Gregory, ‘How We Can Use Livestreaming Apps to Promote Justice’, WIRED, 10 May 2015 
<www.wired.com/2015/05/can-use-livestreaming-apps-promote-justice/>. 
52 Sam Gregory, ‘Co-Presence: A New Way to Bring People Together for Human Rights Activism’, WITNESS Blog, 
23 September 2013 <blog.witness.org/2013/09/co-presence-for-human-rights/>. 
53 Sam Gregory, ‘How We Can Use Livestreaming Apps to Promote Justice’, WIRED, 2015 
<http://www.wired.com/2015/05/can-use-livestreaming-apps-promote-justice/> [accessed 13 May 2015]. 
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entrepreneurs.54  Other initiatives analyze real-time or near real-time big data with 
an aim to forecasting escalating violence.  Hatebase, for example, developed by The 
Sentinel Project and Mobiocracy, monitors the vocabulary and incidence of hate 
speech – which is correlated with a risk of genocide – on social media.55  Satellite 
monitoring projects, such as the 
Satellite Sentinel Project, aim to 
detect potential violations, as 
well as to deter and document 
them.56  Speculation also exists 
about the increasing use of 
drones for the same purposes of 
remote sensing.57 
In practice, however, significant 
limitations exist to the 
possibilities of ICTs for early 
warning systems.  First of all, 
some initiatives – such as human 
rights monitoring via drones – 
raise questions about 
surveillance and privacy.60  
Second, early warning systems 
based on big data mining are 
imbalanced with respect to providing the full suite of functions necessary for a 
successful intervention.  We can understand the latter as depending on the 
execution of three stages: information collection, information analysis, and 
information transmission to local and international actors.61  Though current 
initiatives are strong on data collection, they are weaker on analysis and actionable 
                                                     
54 Ciara Byrne, ‘Welcome To PeaceTech, The Movement To Use Technology To End Violent Conflict And 
Extremism’, Fast Company, 11 August 2015 <http://www.fastcoexist.com/3047534/welcome-to-peacetech-the-
movement-to-use-technology-to-end-violent-conflict-and-extremism>. 
55 Timothy Quinn, ‘Introducing Hatebase: The World’s Largest Online Database of Hate Speech’, The Sentinel 
Project, 2013 <https://thesentinelproject.org/2013/03/25/introducing-hatebase-the-worlds-largest-online-
database-of-hate-speech/>; Timothy Quinn, ‘Meet HateBrain, the Automated Social Media Monitoring Engine at 
the Heart of Hatebase’, The Sentinel Project, 2013 <https://thesentinelproject.org/2013/07/23/meet-hatebrain-
the-automated-social-media-monitoring-engine-at-the-heart-of-hatebase/>. 
56 Ben Yunmo Wang and others, ‘Problems from Hell, Solution in the Heavens?: Identifying Obstacles and 
Opportunities for Employing Geospatial Technologies to Document and Mitigate Mass Atrocities’, Stability: 
International Journal of Security & Development, 2 (2013), 53 <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.cn>. 
57 Andrew Stobo Sniderman and Mark Hanis, ‘Drones for Human Rights’, The New York Times, 30 January 2012 
<www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/opinion/drones-for-human-rights.html>. 
58 Nathaniel A. Raymond and others, ‘While We Watched: Assessing the Impact of the Satellite Sentinel Project’, 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 26 July 2013 <http://journal.georgetown.edu/while-we-watched-
assessing-the-impact-of-the-satellite-sentinel-project-by-nathaniel-a-raymond-et-al/>. 
59 Patrick Meier, ‘Will Using “Live” Satellite Imagery to Prevent War in the Sudan Actually Work?’, iRevolutions, 30 
December 2010 <http://irevolution.net/2010/12/30/sat-sentinel-project/>. 
60 Sarah Stein Kerr, ‘Drones for Good? The Basic Human Rights Considerations’, WITNESS Blog, November 2013 
<https://blog.witness.org/2013/11/drones-for-good-the-basic-human-rights-considerations/>. 
61 Robertson and Olson. 
The Satellite Sentinel Project 
The Satellite Sentinel Project stems from a partnership 
between the Enough Project of the Center for American 
Progress and remote sensing company DigitalGlobe, as well 
as previous collaborations with the United Nations UNITAR 
Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) 
and the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, among others.  It 
monitors the border between Sudan and South Sudan for 
actual and potential threats against civilians.  As with the 
police body-worn cameras initiatives, the project assumes 
that satellite monitoring may deter.  Raising awareness 
among potential perpetrators that vulnerable areas are 
being watched could stymie violations – at least the kinds 
that are visible remotely.58  Celebrity co-founder George 
Clooney likened this to a paparazzi effect with anti-genocide 
aims, saying, ‘We want them to enjoy the level of celebrity 
attention that I usually get. If you know your actions are 
going to be covered, you tend to behave much differently 
than when you operate in a vacuum.’59 
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transmission.62  Questions also arise as to the effectiveness of monitoring for 
deterrence if this monitoring is not coupled with the credible threat of punitive 
measures.63   
The use of big data and remote sensing for the prevention of human rights violations 
also raises methodological and ethical concerns.  The Human Rights Data Analysis 
Group highlights sources of potential inaccuracies in the statistical analysis of human 
rights data arising from selection bias, duplication, and constraints on data capture.64  
Others caution that the increasing quantification of human rights practice may 
abstract human rights violations, distract from the discussion about accountability 
with a conversation about technicalities, and obscure the politics in which the 
processes of counting and using numbers are embedded.65  Some warn that the lack 
of a coherent ethical framework around the use of remote sensing data in human 
rights practice may result in situations where vulnerable populations are put at risk 
through the remote documentation of their locations and situations.66  In 
consideration of these concerns, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative has launched 
The Signal Program on Human Security and Technology to develop strategies and 
ethical guidelines around the use of remote sensing in human rights and 
humanitarian work.67  In sum, the use of ICTs hold promise for the prevention of 
human rights violations, but only if informed by an understanding of how these 
opportunities and their attendant risks and limitations intersect with the contexts of 
their deployment.  
                                                     
62 Himelfarb. 
63 Meier, ‘Will Using “Live” Satellite Imagery to Prevent War in the Sudan Actually Work?’. 
64 Human Rights Data Analysis Group, ‘Core Concepts’, Human Rights Data Analysis Group, 2015 
<hrdag.org/coreconcepts/>. 
65 Kelly M. Greenhill, ‘Nigeria’s Countless Casualties: The Politics of Counting Boko Haram’s Victims’, Foreign 
Affairs, 9 February 2015 <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2015-02-09/nigerias-countless-casualties>; 
Margaret L. Satterthwaite and Justin Simeone, An Emerging Fact-Finding Discipline? A Conceptual Roadmap for 
Social Science Methods in Human Rights Advocacy, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series (New York, 
NY: New York University School of Law, 2014) <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2468261>. 
66 Robertson and Olson. 
67 Harvard Humanitarian Inititative, ‘The Signal Program on Human Security and Technology’, Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative, 2013 <hhi.harvard.edu/programs-and-research/crisis-mapping-and-early-warning/signal-
program>. 
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ICTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE OF FACT-FINDING 
Like prevention, holding perpetrators to account for human rights violations is core 
to the work of the human rights community.  This involves the gathering and 
evaluation of information for evidence – namely the practices of fact-finding 
addressed in this section – followed by advocacy based on that evidence, addressed 
in the next section.68  The evidence may also – or alternatively – be destined for 
court, in which case it will have to meet specific criteria for admissibility; the 
evidence that can be used to generate denunciation through advocacy cannot 
necessarily be used for justice in the courts.69   
Human rights organizations have developed rigorous fact-finding methodologies to 
protect the credibility of their evidence and thus its effectiveness in advocacy and 
courts.  The credibility of the evidence they deploy is also important for human 
rights organizations’ overall reputations of credibility.  This reputational resource is 
key to human rights organizations’ persuasiveness in the context of the counter-
claims and discrediting discourses that are often among the reactions to their 
work.70 
Consequently, the human rights community has developed methodological expertise 
in evaluating information for evidence, part of the professionalization of human 
rights over three generations of actors and tactics.71  Intergovernmental 
organizations drove the first generation of fact-finding, in which diplomats, experts, 
and lawyers reviewed on-the-ground research to write reports for governments and 
intergovernmental groups.  Large, international human rights NGOs spearheaded the 
second generation, which drew largely on witness interviews and produced reports 
targeted at public opinion and political bodies.  The third generation is born of ICTs 
and a growing number and diversity of players in the human rights fact-finding 
arena.  This current generation is characterised by the replacement of previous ‘one-
                                                     
68 Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
69 Madeleine Bair, ‘When YouTube Videos Expose Crimes That Go Unpunished’, PBS Mediashift, 24 February 
2014 <http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2014/02/when-youtube-videos-expose-crimes-that-go-unpunished/>; 
Satterthwaite and Simeone. 
70 Amnesty International, ‘Legal and Research Tools’, Amnesty International, 2015 
<www.amnesty.org/en/human-rights-defenders/resources/legal-and-research-tools>; L. David Brown, Creating 
Credibility (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2008); Alison Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: 
Protest, Change, and Democratization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); Margaret Gibelman and 
Sheldon R. Gelman, ‘A Loss of Credibility: Patterns of Wrongdoing Among Nongovernmental Organizations’, 
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 15 (2004), 355–81 
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Evidence and Engagement Models’, American Behavioral Scientist, 59 (2014), 124–48 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764214540508>; Steven R. Ratner, ‘The Political Dimension of International 
Human Rights Fact-Finding’, in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 2013, 
CVII, 70–72; Margaret Satterthwaite, ‘Finding, Verifying, and Curating Human Rights Facts’, in Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 2013, CVII, 62–65. 
71 Philip Alston, ‘Introduction: Third Generation Human Rights Fact-Finding’, in Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law), 2013, CVII, 61–62; Land, ‘Peer Producing Human Rights’. 
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size-fits-all’ models with more flexibility in fact-finding methodology and research 
output.72  As Satterthwaite explains it: 
Human rights researchers are no longer expected only to ‘find’ and 
report on facts; now, they are also expected to create facts through 
quantitative and statistical analysis; to verify facts established 
through crowd-sourcing, social media, and citizen journalism; and 
to curate facts through new forms of visual display, including 
through web-based photojournalism or documentaries and the use 
of visual analytical tools such as sophisticated – and often 
interactive – data visualization.73 
It is the impact of ICTs on this third generation of fact-finding that is of concern here.  
A major change, building on ICTs’ affordance of user-generated content, has been 
the escalation of information produced and transmitted by civilian witnesses, 
whether spontaneous or solicited.74  These new channels and sources of information 
introduce various challenges, including: (1) the security challenge for the contents, 
subjects, and witnesses of reports; (2) the volume challenge, namely the risk that 
evidence is lost in the deluge of digitally-enabled civilian witness information that 
takes time and expertise to parse; and (3) the verification challenge, related to the 
risk of misinformation arising from ICTs’ facilitation of information production, 
transmission, and manipulation.  This section first outlines the nature and challenges 
of spontaneous and solicited digital civilian witness information.  It goes on to 
explore technologies and tactics deployed against these challenges of ICTs for the 
practice of human rights fact-finding.  
Digital human rights reporting by civilian witnesses  
The contributions of ICTs to the third generation of human rights fact-finding centres 
on their facilitation of civilian witnessing of human rights violations.  Through the 
definition of a civilian as outside of the profession in question, this nomenclature 
highlights the inexpert nature of the production of information by civilian 
witnesses.75  Information from civilian witnesses has long been a cornerstone of 
human rights fact-finding, in part because of the human rights community’s 
commitment to amplifying the voices of those challenging the powerful, such as 
state actors.76  Traditionally, this information tended to be gathered by human rights 
fact-finders.   
                                                     
72 Alston, CVII, p. 61. 
73 Satterthwaite, CVII, p. 65. 
74 McPherson, ‘Advocacy Organizations’ Evaluation of Social Media Information for NGO Journalism: The 
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What ICTs introduce, however, is the ability of civilian witnesses to autonomously 
produce and transmit information, facilitated by technologies such as smartphones 
and social media applications.  Of course, it is not just witnesses and subjects of 
violations that are producing this information, but also perpetrators.  Furthermore, 
the production of this information and its use as evidence do not necessarily mean it 
is shared publicly, nor does sharing it publicly indicate an intention for it to be used 
as evidence.77  As a whole, this information is characterised by its step-change in 
volume as well as the extent to which the process of producing it is outside of the 
control of human rights fact-finders – even in instances where human rights fact-
finders solicit information via digital channels, such as in crowdsourcing and 
crowdseeding.  In other words, ICTs afford the rise of amateurs in a fact-finding 
process traditionally dominated by professionals.78   
Civilian witnessing is, at first glance, a boon, especially in closed-country contexts like 
Syria.  Consider, for example, the fact that local reports about the Syrian 
government’s 2013 chemical weapons attack in Ghouta appeared on social media 
within hours of the attack.79  In contrast, the regime of the current president’s father 
was able to keep the details of the 1982 Hama massacre under wraps for quite some 
time.80  
Additional benefits include increasing the capacity of human rights fact-finding by 
harnessing civilian witnesses’ spare time, energy, and expertise.81  Consulting civilian 
witnesses can also tap into areas of knowledge – particularly knowledge of local 
contexts – that are unfamiliar to human rights fact-finders based elsewhere.  
Furthermore, involving civilian witnesses can fire up public enthusiasm about human 
rights and strengthen the effects of human rights advocacy through greater 
participation in and awareness of human rights investigations.82  This section 
overviews various digital ICT initiatives that facilitate civilian witnesses’ production 
and transmission of information, looking first at spontaneous civilian witnessing and 
then at information solicited via crowdsourcing and crowdseeding.  
Spontaneous reports from civilian witnesses  
Civilian witnesses’ production and transmission of information, at its most 
spontaneous, can occur through pre-existing hardware and software without any 
particular expertise on the part of witnesses.  The growing ubiquity of smartphones 
affords the easy capture of visual and auditory information, and this information can 
be quickly transmitted through digital channels such as social media – to the extent 
                                                     
77 Christoph Koettl, ‘About & FAQ’, Citizen Evidence Lab, 2014 <www.citizenevidence.org/about/>. 
78 Land, ‘Peer Producing Human Rights’. 
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that the conflict in Syria has been referred to as the ‘YouTube War.’83  That being 
said, these mainstream digital tools also present a number of challenges for civilian 
witnessing.   
A major challenge is security; mainstream social media applications can risk the 
security of the information, its subjects, and its civilian witness sources.  The 
information is in peril because human rights content of a graphic nature runs the risk 
of being deleted from social media for contravening permissible content policies.  
Subjects may be identified by their adversaries and may be re-victimized through 
public exposure.84  Civilian witnesses can put themselves in danger both in the 
production and in the transmission of information.   
A second challenge is the quantity of social media information, whether relevant to 
the incident in question or not.  Some contemporary conflicts have a ‘big data 
problem’ (of course, some have the opposite problem because of digital divides in 
terms of access to and familiarity with technology).85  This means that identifying 
relevant information is like searching for a needle in a haystack.  As Morgan of 
CrisisNET describes it: 
…Assessing a conflict like the Syrian civil war using social media is 
the equivalent of aimlessly wandering around Damascus, hoping to 
stumble upon an interesting discussion. There are tens of 
thousands of disparate, sometimes enlightening, but often 
frivolous conversations at any given moment, and the sheer 
volume of information can be overwhelming.86 
A third challenge is the quality of the information as regards the ease of verification.  
Social media information is often characterised by unknown sources and a paucity of 
metadata.  Metadata is information about the information in question – such as 
source, place, and time of production.  It is fundamental to the verification process, 
which hinges on the cross-corroboration of information’s content and metadata 
using other methods and sources.  Mainstream social media applications do not 
usually prompt users to enter metadata; furthermore, they often strip out metadata 
generated by standard photo and video applications at the point of upload.87  ICTs 
also facilitate the spread of manipulated information, as evident in 2014’s ‘SYRIA! 
SYRIAN HERO BOY rescue girl in shootout’ viral video, revealed to be a cinematic 
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February 2014 <www.pbs.org/mediashift/2014/02/the-youtube-war-citizen-videos-revolutionize-human-rights-
monitoring-in-syria/>. 
84 Madeleine Bair, ‘Navigating the Ethics of Citizen Video: The Case of a Sexual Assault in Egypt’, Arab Media & 
Society, 19 (2014), 1–7; Sam Gregory, ‘Images of Horror: Whose Roles and What Responsibilities?’, WITNESS 
Blog, 18 September 2014 <blog.witness.org/2014/09/sharing-images-horror-roles-responsibilities/>. 
85 Lara Setrakian, ‘Citizen Video for Journalists: Contextualization’, WITNESS Blog, 1 April 2013 
<http://blog.witness.org/2013/04/citizen-video-for-journalists-contextualization/>. 
86 Jonathon Morgan, ‘Syrian Social Media, Journalists’ Secret Weapon in the Crisis Data Revolution’, CrisisNET, 3 
June 2014 <http://blog.crisis.net/syrian-social-media-journalists-secret-weapon-in-the-crisis-data-revolution/>. 
87 Mike Ashenfelder, ‘Social Media Networks Stripping Data from Your Digital Photos’, The Signal: Digital 
Preservation, Library of Congress Blog, 2013 <blogs.loc.gov/digitalpreservation/2013/04/social-media-networks-
stripping-data-from-your-digital-photos/>. 
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production disguised as a civilian witness account.  Of course, this is also evident in 
more nefarious attempts to disseminate falsehoods via social media.88   
Solicited reports from civilian witnesses: crowdsourcing and crowdseeding 
Somewhere between human rights fact-finders’ traditional methods of gathering 
information and civilian witnesses’ digitally-enabled spontaneous production and 
transmission are the practices of crowdsourcing and crowdseeding.  Crowdsourcing 
involves institutions turning over tasks normally done by a specific individual to a big, 
unspecified group recruited through an open call.89  In this case, professional human 
rights fact-finders are experimenting with 
relinquishing the production of 
information to the crowds of civilian 
witnesses, often by deploying 
crowdsourcing tools such as those 
developed by Ushahidi.     
Crowdseeding was born in part out of the 
concern that crowdsourcing is not exactly 
representative, but rather tends to attract 
participants with technology, money, and 
time  – in other words, it attracts the 
relatively well-resourced.92  As showcased 
by the Voix des Kivus project in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
crowdseeding is a category of bounded 
crowdsourcing.93  Participants can be 
randomly sampled for representativeness 
and equipped with the technology and 
resources necessary to produce and 
transmit the information being sought.  A 
relationship develops over time between 
chosen civilian witnesses and the project, 
engendering credibility and trust that 
                                                     
88 Madeleine Bair, ‘Will the Syrian Hero Boy Make Us Question Everything We See? (and Why Don’t We Do That 
Already?)’, WITNESS Blog, 20 November 2014 <http://blog.witness.org/2014/11/syrian-hero-boy/>. 
89 Jeff Howe, ‘Crowdsourcing: A Definition’, Crowdsourcing: Why the Power of the Crowd Is Driving the Future of 
Business, 2006 <crowdsourcing.typepad.com/cs/2006/06/crowdsourcing_a.html>. 
90 Ushahidi, ‘Ushahidi’s Mission’, Ushahidi, 2015 <http://www.ushahidi.com/mission/>. 
91 Vicky Baker, ‘Syria’s Inside Track: Mapping Citizen Reporting’, Index on Censorship, 43 (2014), 93–95 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306422014535688>. 
92 Patrick Meier, ‘From Crowdsourcing Crisis Information to Crowdseeding Conflict Zones (Updated)’, 
iRevolutions, 10 July 2012 <http://irevolution.net/2012/07/10/crowdsourcing-to-crowdseeding/>. 
93 Peter van der Windt, ‘Voix Des Kivus: A Crowd-Seeding System in DRC’, Ushahidi, 16 May 2011 
<http://www.ushahidi.com/blog/2011/05/16/voix-des-kivus-a-crowd-seeding-system-in-drc/>. 
Ushahidi and Syria Tracker 
Ushahidi, Swahili for ‘testimony,’ is a non-profit 
company that, among other services, provides 
open source reporting and mapping tools.  It was 
founded during the 2008 post-election violence in 
Kenya and initially aimed to plot crowd-sourced 
reports of violence and conflict resolution.  
Ushahidi built on that experience to develop 
crowdsourcing tools that anyone can adopt.90    
In 2011, Humanitarian Tracker adopted Ushahidi 
to power Syria Tracker.  Its team, made up of 
activists in Syria and the U.S., maps reports 
related to the conflict, such as deaths, detentions, 
chemical poisonings, and rape.  These reports 
include information extracted using data-mining 
from more than 80 million social media posts and 
160,000 media reports, as well as more than 4,000 
eyewitness reports.  The latter incorporates 
crowdsourced information submitted via the 
project’s website as well as information from more 
than 600 amateur reporters on the ground in 
Syria.  Before making reports public, the team 
verifies them via corroboration of time and place 
with other reports, which means that published 
reports make up only 6% of all the reports 
collected by Syria Tracker.91 
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facilitate communication.94 
Like spontaneous civilian witnessing, solicited civilian witnessing creates new 
challenges.  Solicited reports may be submitted privately, which does mitigate some 
of the security risks of spontaneous public reports over social media.  But other risks 
may stem from crowdsourcing and crowdseeding projects’ tendency to publicly map 
information, which – like satellite images – may jeopardise vulnerable populations in 
those terrains.95  Another susceptibility is uncertainty around who exactly is soliciting 
the reports, and to what end.  For example, a malevolent regime might deploy 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a brokerage service providing micro-task labourers, to 
match faces from photographs of protests with photographs from national identity 
cards – perhaps even disguised as a game.96  The volume and verification challenges 
of solicited information are perhaps not as extensive as those of spontaneous 
information, since crowdsourcing and crowdseeding projects solicit on-topic 
information and can prompt witnesses to include metadata.  That being said, these 
challenges remain a concern in human rights fact-finders’ evaluation of digital 
civilian witness information for evidence. 
Fact-finders’ evaluation of civilian witness information for evidence 
The digital flood of information from civilian witnesses only has evidentiary potential 
if human rights fact-finders successfully evaluate it.  The evaluation of information 
for evidence has at least two stages: identifying relevant information and verifying 
that information.97  This section outlines the technologies and tactics that fact-
finders are developing and deploying to integrate digital civilian witness information 
into their traditional human rights practices and to address the challenges this 
information poses.  The security challenge crosscuts information evaluation as fact-
finders endeavour to mitigate the new risks that digital reports pose to the 
information, its subjects, and its witnesses.  The volume challenge is particularly a 
concern for the first stage of evaluation; the digital facilitation of collaboration and 
search functions supports expert sifting of the wheat from the chaff.  The volume of 
this potentially relevant information, however, also poses a challenge for the 
verification stage.  This is because verification is a time-intensive process centred on 
human expertise deployed against individual reports.  ICTs can mitigate the 
verification challenge to a certain extent by supporting corroboration, including 
through the provision of ‘verification subsidies’ by third parties to the human rights 
                                                     
94 Molly Land and others, #ICT4HR: Information and Communication Technologies for Human Rights (Rochester, 
NY: Social Science Research Network, 20 November 2012) <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2178484>; Meier, 
‘From Crowdsourcing Crisis Information to Crowdseeding Conflict Zones (Updated)’. 
95 Land and others. 
96 Zittrain, Jonathan, ‘The Internet Creates a New Kind of Sweatshop’, Newsweek, 7 December 2009 
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fact-finding process.98  This often depends, however, on sufficient digital verification 
literacy among human rights fact-finders and civilian witnesses, and consequently a 
number of projects address existing literacy lacunae.   
Addressing the security challenge 
Given the aforementioned risk of deletion for information circulating on social 
media, as well as the risk of corruption and obsolescence of digital data, various 
resources have been developed to assist human rights fact-finders with securely 
archiving their information.  These include the extensive guide produced by Witness 
for activists on archiving video.99  Other examples are Martus, a system developed 
by Benetech for the digital organization, storage, backup and sharing of information, 
and OpenEvSys, a database application for recording, storing, searching, and 
analysing documented violations.100   
The vulnerability of the subjects of digital civilian witness reports can be lessened 
through rendering identities as anonymous as possible.  ObscuraCam is an Android 
app co-developed by The Guardian Project and Witness that allows users to pixelate 
faces in videos and photos.101  YouTube also has a face blurring feature.102  Though 
these initiatives may disguise subjects’ identities and thus protect them from 
retribution, they still may not prevent re-victimization due to the circulation of the 
subject’s suffering.103  The latter requires a broader consideration of the ethics of 
representation in human rights information and how they can be translated into 
civilian witness reporting applications.104 
A number of ICT initiatives aim to reduce the risk of civilian witnesses arising from 
the moment of documentation, when they are in the same physical space as the 
perpetrator of the violation.  These projects disguise the collection of information.  
Apps like Silent Lens, a concept arising from a Google ‘Develop for Good’ hackathon, 
allow users to secretly take photos while appearing to use the email or phone 
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Mexican Human Rights NGOs’ (working paper, 2015) 
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99 Witness, ‘Activists’ Guide to Archiving Video’, Witness, 2013 <http://archiveguide.witness.org>. 
100 Benetech, Martus: Helping Human Rights Advocates Protect, Manage, and Effectively Utilize Information 
(Benetech, n.d.) <www.martus.org/resources/Martus-Intro-Presentation-v50.pdf>; HURIDOCS, ‘OpenEvsys – for 
Documenting Violations’, HURIDOCS, 2015 <https://www.huridocs.org/openevsys/>. 
101 The Guardian Project, ‘ObscuraCam: Secure Smart Camera’, The Guardian Project, 2015 
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102 Sam Gregory, ‘Visual Anonymity and YouTube’s New Blurring Tool’, WITNESS Blog, July 2012 
<blog.witness.org/2012/07/visual-anonymity-and-youtubes-new-blurring-tool/>; Sameer Padania, ‘Advocacy’s 
Long and Winding Road’, Sameer Padania, 2012 <http://blog.sameerpadania.com/2012/07/19/youtube-witness-
face-blurring-advocacy/>; Youtube, ‘Face Blurring: When Footage Requires Anonymity’, Official YouTube Blog, 18 
July 2012 <http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2012/07/face-blurring-when-footage-requires.html>. 
103 Madeleine Bair, ‘Abuse by Viral Video: Break the Cycle with Identity Protecting Tools’, WITNESS Blog, August 
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applications on their smartphones.105  Videre Est Credere is an NGO that trains and 
equips activists in remote areas to use covert digital video cameras – hidden in items 
like pens, watches, and keyfobs – to document human rights violations.106  Of 
course, like human rights defenders, civilian witnesses should ideally understand and 
be able to deploy the encryption and anonymity technologies outlined above to 
increase their security as they transmit their reports. 
Addressing the volume challenge 
The relevance of information to human rights fact-finding depends on a number of 
variables both particular to the case in question as well as universal – such as 
whether or not the information documents a violation and whether or not it 
contains the details necessary for verification.  Addressing the volume challenge of 
digital information is about using human and machine power to intelligently winnow 
the relevant from the irrelevant.  In other 
words, these initiatives tackle the ‘signal-
to-noise ratio’ problem of social media 
and similar applications.107   
Human power can be harnessed through 
the digital enablement of collaboration, as 
in the crowdsourcing done by the Standby 
Task Force.  This is a network of trained 
volunteers – ‘digital humanitarians’ – who 
deploy digital skills in support of crisis-
affected communities, including human 
rights crises.108  These volunteers, a 
bounded crowd, support the collaborative 
evaluation of information through, for 
example, tagging government tanks in 
satellite images of Syria.109  By splicing 
expert tasks into microtasks, relatively 
amateur crowds can analyse aspects of 
large quantities of information quickly.  That said, the participants are necessarily 
limited to simpler tasks such as feature-spotting, and even then they pose risks of 
omissions due to inexperience; the Standby Task Force analysis therefore involved 
expert oversight from Amnesty International USA.110  Another approach for sifting 
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109 Patrick Meier, ‘Combining Crowdsourced Satellite Imagery Analysis with Crisis Reporting: An Update on Syria’, 
iRevolutions, 19 September 2011 <http://irevolution.net/2011/09/19/crowdsourcing-update-on-syria/>. 
110 Wang and others. 
Syria Right Now 
Eliot Higgins, expert on the analysis of social media 
information and founder of Brown Moses Blog and 
Bellingcat, is developing Syria Right Now.  This 
application is a manually curated collection of 
social media accounts belonging to the Syrian 
opposition.   
Researchers wanting to know real-time 
information about an event in a particular place 
will be able visit Syria Right Now and instantly get 
a curated feed of original content from known 
sources related to that location.  As Higgins 
describes it, ‘Ultimately I want to change the 
discovery stage for examining social media from 
Syrian opposition areas from something that can 
take hours to something that's a few mouse clicks, 
and even have the content come and find you. 
Then more time can be spent on verification rather 
than finding something worth verifying’ (Eliot 
Higgins, personal communication, 7 January 2015). 
 CGHR, 2015 
 
20 
digital information is manual curation, as employed by the Syria Right Now project in 
its selection and geolocation of social media sources. 
Machine power can be harnessed through enabling and automating data cleansing 
and search functions on large datasets of potentially relevant information.  
CrisisNET, a Ushahidi project funded by the Rockefeller Foundation is a ‘firehose of 
global crisis data’ based on its collection and standardization of real-time digital crisis 
data for individual researchers to search quickly and efficiently.111  This platform, 
currently in beta, draws on thousands of sources producing information pertinent to 
crises, such as social media, Ushahidi crowdmaps, news outlets, and UNHCR refugee 
reports.112   
Addressing the verification challenge 
Once relevant information has been identified, it must be verified.  Though the 
nature of the information being verified and the techniques and tools for verification 
are shifting rapidly as ICTs evolve, the fundamentals of verification remain constant: 
identifying and corroborating the content and the metadata of the information using 
a variety of methods and sources.  Given the subjective nature of facticity, 
verification remains a human – indeed expert – practice.113   
Nevertheless, digital tools are in development to speed and simplify this process.  
This section first outlines steps of the verification practice and the tactics of digital 
information forensics developed to address them.  It goes on to examine the specific 
category of third parties ‘verification subsidies,’ developed to enhance the metadata 
of civilian witnesses’ information or to take on some of the verification labour.114  
The section concluded by outlining some of the initiatives underway to boost digital 
literacy around verification – a challenge when many witnesses are spontaneous and 
many NGOs’ resources are already strained.115   
The fundamentals of verification and digital information forensics 
The verification of digital information from civilian witnesses can be a long and 
complicated process.116  Digital information forensics is an area of expertise that 
combines digital tools and databases with traditional gumshoe verification tactics.117  
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These tactics focus on cross-referencing the provenance, source, time and place of 
the information.  These may be particularly difficult to establish for digital 
information, as it can be relatively disembodied from the source and context of its 
production.    
Unearthing a piece of information’s 
provenance is about establishing the 
chain-of-custody of the information 
and tracing it back to the original 
source.  This step helps check that the 
content and its metadata have not 
been altered or manipulated – 
especially given the prevalent practice 
on YouTube of ‘scraping’ or recycling 
content without attribution.122  
Reverse image search applications like 
those provided by Google or TinEye 
can help; users can upload or link to 
an image, and these applications will 
return the locations of matching 
copies.123   
The fact-finder should ideally speak 
with the original source to assess her story of witnessing and documenting the 
event.124  Verification experts recommend that fact-finders then examine the 
source’s digital footprint for organizational affiliations, posting history, followers and 
friends, and location.125  For example, the longevity of a social media account may 
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pp. 33–44 <verificationhandbook.com/book/chapter4.php>. 
124 Barot. 
125 Malachy Browne, ‘Verifying Video’, in Verification Handbook: An Ultimate Guideline on Digital Age Sourcing 
for Emergency Coverage, ed. by Craig Silverman (Maastricht, the Netherlands: European Journalism Centre, 
2014), pp. 45–67 <verificationhandbook.com/book/chapter5.php>; Della Kilroy, ‘Citizen Video for Journalists: 
Verification’, WITNESS Blog, 25 February 2013 <blog.witness.org/2013/02/citizen-video-for-journalists-
verification/>; Meier, ‘How to Verify Social Media Content’; Silverman and Tsubaki. 
Documenting a Boko Haram attack in Nigeria 
using satellites 
Fact-finders at Amnesty International and at Human 
Rights Watch undertook change detection analysis 
of satellite images of two towns in north-eastern 
Nigeria on the 2nd and 7th of January, 2015.118  These 
revealed extensive destruction from fire damage.  
Researchers cross-referenced this information with 
eyewitness testimonies to establish that the fires 
were part of attacks by Boko Haram militants on 
these towns in which hundreds were killed.119  This 
cross-referencing of satellite images is important as, 
on their own, these remote images do little to 
establish culpability and causality.120  This case was 
a ‘text book example’ of what satellite images can 
do for human rights fact-finding, both in terms of 
remote sensing hard-to-reach areas and in terms of 
producing powerful imagery for advocacy in the 
form of before-and-after pictures.121   
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indicate credibility, because misinformation is often posted to new accounts.126  
Because it delves the ‘deep web’ of databases like public records and online profiles 
not currently indexed by mainstream search engines, pipl.com can facilitate this.127  
As Wardle warns, however, ‘there is no quick way’ of verifying the identity of a social 
media account; rather, this it requires ‘painstaking checks,’ akin to ‘old-fashioned 
police investigation.’128 
The next stage is verifying the time and place of production.  Fact-finders may 
identify this metadata when they speak to the source, or it may be evident in the 
information.  The source may have included it as part of production, such as by 
stating the location and date on camera, or as part of transmission, such as by 
providing commentary upon upload to YouTube.  Clues about time and place may 
stem from landmarks, shadows, weather, signage, clothing, weapons, and dialect 
captured in the content.129  It may also be automatically embedded in the file, such 
as in the timestamp; digital applications, like FotoForensics and the Citizen Evidence 
Lab’s YouTube Data Viewer, can facilitate the extraction of this metadata.130 
Fact-finders can corroborate time and place with digital databases, which can easily 
be searched for landmarks (Google Maps) and weather histories (Wolfram Alpha).131  
Another source of digital data for corroboration is satellite images.  Of course, all of 
this digital information can also be corroborated offline through on-the-ground 
research and by tapping into trusted and expert networks.132  
As is clear from the above, corroboration through consulting other sources and 
methods is key to the verification process; a single source is not enough.133  De Rosa 
explains it well: ‘The information you’re seeing on social media should be the first 
step toward trying to verify what actually occurred, rather than the final word.’134  As 
such, it is clear that turning this information into evidence can require a significant 
amount of time and expertise.   
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Third party verification subsidies 
Several initiatives are underway that reduce the amount of time needed by fact-
finders and the amount of expertise needed by both fact-finders and civilian 
witnesses.  These are verification subsidies provided by third parties, which – after 
Gandy’s concept of ‘information 
subsidies’ – are strategies 
designed to make information 
easier to use.135  Two categories of 
verification subsidies are 
considered here, those that 
enhance the metadata of civilian 
witnesses’ digital information, and 
those that supplant some of fact-
finders’ verification labour.  Each 
category includes both human and 
machine-powered initiatives. 
In the first category of verification 
subsidies, one approach is to 
encourage civilian witnesses to 
include metadata at the point of 
transmission. The Syria Tracker 
project, for example, which 
crowdsources information about 
the conflict in Syria using the 
Ushahidi platform, requires 
submitters to enter a title, 
description, category of incident, 
and the location and time of 
reporting.  Submitters also have 
the option of including digital 
images, contact information, and links to news sources and external video.139  
Prompts like these have a knock-on effect of boosting civilian witnesses’ verification 
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[accessed 17 September 2015]. 
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Metadata-enhancement initiatives 
CameraV: Witness and the Guardian Project are using 
funding from the Knight Foundation’s Knight News 
Challenge to develop CameraV, the public Android app 
based on their InformaCam platform.  CameraV allows 
users to take photos or videos and then annotate them, 
notarize them with a unique identifier, and share them.  
It encrypts the stored files and can automatically embed 
them with metadata from the phone’s GPS, Wi-Fi, and 
Bluetooth sensors.136 
eyeWitness to atrocities: Developed by the International 
Bar Association, this app automatically embeds 
metadata into civilian witness video and photographs, 
then encrypts and locally stores this information with 
additional metadata that allows analysts to check for 
manipulation of content.  The witness can send their 
photo or video with accompanying metadata to 
eyeWitness for storage and expert analysis.137 
FotoAhora: As protests in Venezuela grew in 2014, so did 
misinformation circulating on social media.  In quick 
reaction, publicity company Mood Agency released 
FotoAhora, a Spanish-language app for iOS and Android 
that allows a user to take a photo and enter text on 
where they are and what is happening.  The app then 
posts the image on the user’s Twitter account with the 
hashtag #Venezuela.  The Tweet also includes metadata 
gathered through the phone and a code that can be 
traced to ensure that the photo was captured with 
FotoAhora at the stated time and place.138 
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literacy.  Other projects, like CameraV, eyeWitness to atrocities, and FotoAhora, 
automate metadata inclusion at the point of capture.140   
In terms of verification subsidies that take on some of fact-finders’ labour, one 
strategy is to harness the power of the crowd.  An example is Veri.ly, a web-based 
project in development via collaboration between the University of Southampton, 
Masdar Institute, and QCRI.  Veri.ly crowdsources verification by asking members of 
the public to corroborate or contradict a piece of information with textual or visual 
evidence.141  The Citizen Media Evidence Partnership, a project being developed by 
Amnesty International’s Sensor Project and Will H. Moore of Florida State University, 
also draws on a bounded crowd.  This project trains student groups to become 
‘verification corps’ dedicated to triaging information for verification by experts.142  
Other applications, such as Checkdesk, developed by social technology nonprofit 
Meedan and tailored for individual newsrooms, support collaborative and 
transparent team verification.143 
Another strategy is to support the process of cross-referencing information against 
other sources and types of data.  UC Berkeley CITRIS Data and Democracy is 
designing the Rashomon Project, for example, to facilitate the time-syncing of a 
number of civilian witness videos of the same incident so as to provide a ‘multi-
perspective video timeline.’144  The Whistle, a project in development at the 
University of Cambridge, aims to automatically compare information inputted by 
civilian witnesses against information from some of the digital information forensics 
tools and databases listed above.145   
Other projects are exploring the machine provision of verification subsidies for fact-
finders.  TweetCred, for example, developed by a team of academics from the 
Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology and the Qatar Computing Research 
Institute, attempts this through a machine-learning algorithm.  TweetCred rates the 
credibility of individual Tweets real-time by evaluating them against 45 criteria.  
These include aspects of the Tweet’s content – such as emoticons, swearwords, and 
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hashtags – as well as the metadata of the Tweet and information about its author, 
such as number of followers.146   
Digital verification literacy 
While digital information forensics and third party verification subsidies potentially 
speed the verification process, knowing about them does require some degree of 
digital verification literacy.  Human rights fact-finders, driven by their field’s culture 
of concern with methodology, can tap into networks of knowledge-exchange, and 
various projects offer resources for human rights fact-finders to build their digital 
verification expertise.  For example, the Verification Handbook, published in 2014 by 
the European Journalism Centre, gathers insight from leading verification experts 
and quickly became a reference point for human rights fact-finders, humanitarians, 
and journalists.147  Amnesty’s Citizen Evidence Lab is a knowledge exchange space 
for human rights fact-finders and defenders about using digital information.148  
Witness’ Media Lab gathers together resources to inform the curation and 
verification of civilian witness videos.149  New Tactics in Human Rights recently 
hosted an online conversation, publicly available and archived, on ‘Using Video for 
Documentation and Evidence.’150 
Resources designed for journalists can be equally relevant, given the core 
information value of veracity in both professions.151  These include the BBC Academy 
website, targeted at professional journalists, and Eliot Higgins’ Bellingcat website, 
targeted at citizen investigative journalists.152  The blog by Storyful, a social media 
news agency now owned by News Corp, contain useful verification tactics and case 
studies.153  Josh Stearns’ Verification Junkie Tumblr blog collects digital verification 
tools.154  First Draft News is an amalgamation of advice on using civilian witness 
information, and 2015 saw the publication of the Verification Handbook for 
Investigative Reporting.155  The more knowledge about digital information forensics 
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that human rights fact-finders have, the more comfortably and quickly they will be 
able to use digital information from civilian witnesses. 
Increasing verification knowledge among civilian witnesses is another way to 
facilitate the verification process.  Witness, for example, provides a guide for 
individuals filming for human rights on what to include in their videos (and is also 
producing the related ‘Visualize Justice: A Field Guide to Enhancing the Evidentiary 
Value of Video for Human Rights,’ to be released soon).156  The guide makes clear 
that investigators need to know the what, when, where, and – if safe – the who of 
the video.  Accordingly, Witness provides sample scripts, slates, and other tactics 
that those filming can use to transmit these facts.   As the guide explains, in the vein 
of verification subsidies: 
Adding this information to videos will make it much easier for 
reviewers that were not at the scene of the human rights incident 
to verify the content.  Easier verification means there is a better 
chance that the video will be used to secure justice.157  
Compared with knowledge-exchange among human rights fact-finders, it is less 
clear, however, how knowledge about producing and transmitting information 
effectively, safely, and ethically for evidence can diffuse among civilian witnesses, 
particularly those who are truly spontaneous.158  As Gregory explains with reference 
to the spontaneous civilian witness who inspired the founding of Witness:  
…We know that today’s version of George Holliday, the man who 
filmed the Rodney King incident, won’t have a dedicated human 
rights app.  And even if he does, if he’s in a high-risk situation, it 
may help single him out as an activist.159 
It is for this reason that Gregory advocates for the inclusion of an ‘eyewitness’ mode 
resembling InformaCam as standard in pre-installed photo and video tools on 
smartphones and in social media applications.160  The mainstreaming of verification 
technologies means that civilian witnesses are more likely to know about them and 
thus to use them.  That being said, volume and verification remain significant 
challenges for fact-finders’ use of this information as evidence.  Furthermore, one’s 
ability to be a digital civilian witness, and to be relatively secure in doing so, is 
inflected by one’s relative access to resources – an issue addressed in the conclusion 
of this report. 
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ICTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE OF ADVOCACY 
By communicating evidence, advocacy works hand-in-hand with fact-finding in the 
pursuit of human rights accountability.  Advocacy is the systematic pursuit of 
particular causes, often via targeting individuals and institutions with information 
aiming to impel change.161  This section looks in particular at two categories of 
advocacy targets: the wider public, whom advocacy aims to mobilize, and the 
individual target, whether a violator of human rights or someone in a position to put 
pressure on a violator.  Human rights advocacy is more than just communicating 
evidence, however; it also includes the promotion of environments knowledgeable 
about and supportive of human rights – and thus receptive to advocacy.162 
Human rights organizations are harnessing ICTs in their advocacy and promotion 
practices to benefit from particular affordances for communication and analysis.  
These comprise the abilities to communicate quickly, directly, publicly, and 
interactively with targets as well as to analyse the performance of messages and the 
nature and segmentation of audiences.163  Such affordances are not exclusive to 
ICTs, as pre-existing communication channels allowed them as well, and human 
rights organizations tend to deploy digital and traditional communication tactics 
together.164  ICTs such as social media, however, can make advocacy faster and 
cheaper.165   
Of course, these affordances can also be hindrances for human rights advocacy with 
particular respect to broadening participation without deepening it and to creating 
new risks for the organizational reputations so important for its effectiveness.  
Meanwhile, ICTs may create new human rights educational opportunities, but these 
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are competing for attention in an ever-proliferating information context – and one 
that is only accessible to the digitally literate.166 
Public mobilization          
Optimism exists for digital human rights advocacy in part because ICTs allow human 
rights organizations to communicate direct-to-citizen, bypassing the traditional but 
often inscrutable public communication channels of the mainstream media.  This 
largely untested optimism has fuelled innovation in a variety of advocacy practices 
harnessing social media and other applications for mobilizing the public.168  ICTs are 
deployed for public mobilization in a variety of ways, including the two featured 
here: engaging the public in the visible 
amplification of advocacy messages and 
increasing the visibility of cases and issues, 
including those neglected by the 
mainstream media.   
Human rights organizations have 
developed expertise in using social media 
to quickly and directly engage members of 
the public in their causes.  The extent of 
the public’s engagement in the advocacy 
message is rendered visible through their 
participation in likes, shares, re-tweets, 
and other numerical metrics on social 
media.  The volume of participation, part 
of the advocacy strategy itself, is also 
evident in the automated aggregation of 
messages on social media applications 
through the use of hashtags.  Among the 
most shared human rights tweets of 2014, 
for example, were those containing the 
hashtags #Ferguson, referencing the 
police shooting of Michael Brown and subsequent unrest there; #BringBackOurGirls, 
protesting the abduction of 200 schoolgirls by Boko Haram in Chibok, Nigeria; and 
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#YaMeCansé and the enforced disappearance 
of 43 Mexican students 
In September 2014, students from a rural 
teacher-training college in Ayotzinapa, Mexico, 
who were mobilizing to protest education 
conditions, got into a clash with police.  Two 
were killed along with three bystanders, a third 
was found dead the next day, and the police 
abducted 43.  At the time of publication, the 
charred remains of just a single student have 
been identified.  Following an off-the-cuff 
remark by the Attorney General in a press 
conference about the case, ‘Ya me cansé,’ or 
‘I’m tired,’ the hashtag #YaMeCansé surfaced on 
Twitter.  Users stated that they too were tired of 
the state of affairs, including the 23,000 missing 
and 100,000 killed since the war on drugs 
started in 2006.  This hashtag and its derivatives 
trended in Mexico for weeks and coincided with 
protests and other mobilization tactics.  Still, the 
Mexican government declared the case closed in 
January 2015, despite protestations that there is 
not enough evidence yet to do so.167 
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#CARCrisis, about the ongoing violence in Central African Republic.169  As social 
media metrics can convey the level of public interest in a campaign, they allow NGOs 
to have some measure of the effects of advocacy, which traditionally have been very 
difficult to isolate and expensive to test.170   
Getting hashtags to trend is not just an organic process; rather, it often involves 
coordinated strategies.  For example, Amnesty International USA used a number of 
social media tactics in its #MDRepeal campaign against the death penalty in 
Maryland.  These included ‘twitterbombing,’ namely synchronising a number of 
Twitter users to tweet the same hashtag at the same time at the same target – in 
their case, the Twitter account of Maryland’s governor.  They also used ‘Twitter 
chats,’ coordinated Q&As about the topic, and ‘livetweeting’ events related to the 
repeal of the death penalty, which allowed the team to ‘frame the story.’171   
Various ICT applications exist to support public mobilization advocacy on social 
media.  Thunderclap, for example, a self-designated ‘crowdspeaking platform,’ 
allows users to donate their ‘social reach’ to share a single message in unison.  Users 
give Thunderclap permission to post this message from their accounts.  This happens 
simultaneously across all participating accounts only after the goal number of 
supporters has been reached.172  For example, in 2014, the International Federation 
for Human Rights organized a thunderclap for the 17th of April, Syria’s official 
Independence Day, stating: ‘#Syria: Free activists, media & humanitarian workers 
arbitrarily detained or abducted for their work #freeSYvoices 
http://thndr.it/1iGdclw.’  Through the social media networks of 256 supporters, the 
thunderclap reached over two million people.173   
Through such social media tools and strategies, the human rights community and 
interested members of the public aim to get or keep a case or issue on the public 
agenda.  ICTs thus facilitate the visibility of human rights on a mass level – or at least 
those of the masses who are connected to social media.  ICTs also facilitate the 
visibility of human rights on an individual level through the smartphones that are by 
many people’s sides day and night.  Apps, such as Amnesty’s AiCandle, are, as 
Amnesty describes it, ‘The fastest way to take action for human rights – at your 
fingertips.’  This app allows users to take actions such as signing petitions and writing 
emails through their smartphones.  These initiatives for ‘Pocket Protest’ – as another 
Amnesty project to quickly mobilize members by SMS message is called – can be 
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particularly useful for urgent mobilization, as members can be notified and can act 
instantly.174 
Another visibility affordance of social media for human rights advocacy is its 
potential for highlighting cases and issues under-reported in the mainstream media.  
The ongoing conflict in the Central African Republic, for example, had received 
relatively little coverage in the English-speaking media.  Peter Bouckaert, the head of 
the emergency team at Human Rights Watch, is credited with attracting some 
attention to the crisis by tweeting about events and atrocities that he witnessed on 
field visits, using the #CARcrisis hashtag.175    
Direct targeting          
Using social media can help the human rights 
community visibly engage publics, but they 
can also help channel these publics’ outrage 
towards a particular target.  Direct public 
targeting, whether the message is sent by a 
member of the public or a human rights 
organization, is relatively straightforward on 
social media.  Users can, for example, 
mention the target in their tweets or post a 
comment on a target’s Facebook page – 
provided the target has not elected to review 
visitor posts prior to publication.  
These tactics may have particular windows of opportunity related to what some call 
the ‘dictator’s dilemma.’177  This is understood as authoritarian regimes’ choice of 
restricting online access and thus harming their economies versus broadly allowing 
online access and thus facilitating resistance.178  The window of opportunity is when 
political targets are new to social media and thus new to the interactive and public 
nature of it that can facilitate public criticism.  Regimes’ sensitivity to public criticism 
may impel them to mitigate situations of human rights violations.  Cuba, for example 
– where Internet use is very restricted – has released detained activists following 
campaigns on Twitter asking them to do so.179  These windows of opportunity may 
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#eyesonSyria 
Amnesty’s multi-pronged ‘Eyes on Syria’ 
campaign used Twitter for direct targeting.   
Its aim was to persuade Russia to support 
efforts by the UN Security Council to put 
pressure on the Syrian Government.  
Amnesty requested that supporters tweet 
at Russian Prime Minister Dmitry 
Medvedev using the hashtag #eyesonsyria.  
Supporters were asked to do this in a 
specific two-hour window, and the hashtag 
briefly trended globally on Twitter.176   
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close once governments become accustomed to digital flak and have strategies in 
place to deflect it. 
Despite the affordances of ICTs for advocacy, the jury is still out as to whether they 
are markedly changing advocacy dynamics for the better – or changing them at all.  
First, this kind of public mobilization has been criticised as ‘clicktivism,’ a 21st century 
version of armchair activism.  Gladwell, for example, describes social media activism 
as composed of weak ties good for the spread of information, whereas ‘high-risk 
activism’ – which actually impels change – needs strong ties.  ‘Social networks are 
effective at increasing participation,’ he writes, ‘by lessening the level of motivation 
that participation requires.’180  Furthermore, the demands arising from such 
participation may be misguided because the brevity of social media formats stymies 
a full understanding of the scenario.181  Another problem, not limited to but rather 
reproduced in digital advocacy, is the imbalance between who advocates versus 
whom is advocated about.  Both the #StopKony campaign, a 2012 social media 
project by NGO Invisible Children advocating for the capture of Ugandan warlord 
Joseph Kony, and 2014’s #Bringbackourgirls, a viral hashtag protesting extremist 
group Boko Haram’s kidnapping of Nigerian schoolgirls, have been critiqued for their 
neo-imperialistic overtones.182  Others are quick, however, to defend digitally-
enabled pluralism in human rights advocacy.  For example, Vie applauds the Human 
Rights Campaign’s marriage equality meme, a red box containing a pink equals sign, 
which Facebook users adopted en masse as their profile pictures in 2013.  Vie argues 
that such ‘seemingly insignificant moves’ are significant in their accumulation 
through demonstrating a ‘supportive environment’ and through ‘drawing 
awareness.’183  
Second, of concern here as well is the mediatisation of human rights advocacy, in 
which advocacy practices are altered – not necessarily for the better – in response to 
the rising prominence of social media in advocacy.  For example, the affordance of 
user analytics is, on the one hand, useful for demonstrating the extent of the public’s 
engagement with an issue.  On the other hand, the more campaigns are focused 
around participation numbers, the greater the risk of focusing on ‘popular’ human 
rights issues to the detriment of more complicated and less compelling issues – at 
least with respect to the brief and visual language of social media 
communications.184   
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Third, social media’s affordance of virality, allowing for the rapid spread of 
information, can sit uneasily with human rights evidence and traditional human 
rights advocacy.  This is because virality tends to be correlated to messages of hope, 
humour, and shock.  Still, human rights advocacy can go viral, as exemplified by aid 
organization Plan’s controversial 2014 campaign highlighting the plight of child 
brides.  This campaign successfully harnessed the mechanism of shock; its fake blog 
purportedly written by ‘Thea,’ a 12-year-old Norwegian girl, about her impending 
marriage to 37-year-old Geir, has attracted more visits than any other blog in 
Norway.185   
Fourth, social media’s affordance of speed, which underpins virality, creates the risk 
of errors.  Errors are detrimental to human rights organizations’ reputations for 
credibility and thus imperil the effectiveness of their advocacy.  Interactivity, which 
facilitates relationship-building with members and publics, also opens the door for 
public critique.  This can particularly problematic in the early stages of adoption, 
before organizations have built up online user communities that naturally tend to 
monitor NGOs’ profiles, responding to criticisms.186  Here, as with all the uses of ICTs 
for human rights, digital literacy is clearly needed. 
Human rights promotion         
Supporting individuals’ knowledge about 
human rights is part of promoting a culture 
that values and safeguards rights and 
responds to their violation.  ICTs create new 
channels and applications – including web 
resources, mobile apps, and games – for 
raising awareness of rights and the 
mechanisms for protecting and defending 
them.  The web interface Human Rights Atlas, 
for example, developed by the University of 
Essex and partners, allows users to easily 
search for demographic indicators, human 
rights legal commitments, and human rights 
performance at the country level.189   
Complementary to this provision of data is the focus among other web resources on 
the provision of human rights education.  ‘International Human Rights’ is a free 
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The Universal Adventure of Human Rights: 
Interplanetary Mission 
This online game (La Aventura Universal de 
los Derechos Humanos: Misión 
Interplanetaria) was developed by Caja 
Madrid Obra Social, the foundation arm of 
the Caja Madrid savings bank.  It is 
targeted at 6 to 12 years olds and is 
designed to introduce them to the articles 
of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.187  For example, to learn about 
Article 3’s ‘right to life, liberty and security 
of person,’ the player travels to Planet Life 
to rescue extraterrestrials from their 
pursuers.188  
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online course available as a massive open online course (MOOC) hosted on platform 
edX.190  Nonprofit Youth for Human Rights has developed an educational iPad and 
iPhone app for school-age students that will soon be provided in more than a dozen 
languages.191  Games targeting children aim to teach human rights through play.  
These initiatives promoting human rights draw on the affordances of ICTs for 
analytics, interactivity, and even portability.  They go some way towards fostering 
the ubiquity of human rights ideas among users around the world.  That said, this 
exposure to human rights knowledge, and the benefits it brings to individuals 
seeking to protect themselves, is available largely to citizens on one side of digital 
divides.  
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CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR APPROACHING ICTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICE  
This report has provided a snapshot of the use of ICTs in human rights practice, a 
fast-paced area in which understanding and literacy lag developments on the 
ground.  This report aims to shorten this lag and to provide a foundation for 
academics and practitioners interested in this space.  In terms of prevention, ICTs 
can be harnessed to protect human rights defenders, to prevent violations in police-
civilian interactions, and in data-driven early warning systems and communication-
based conflict prevention.  That being said, the use of ICTs also creates new security 
risks for HRDs and can violate the right to privacy.  In terms of fact-finding, ICTs 
afford the spontaneous and solicited participation of civilian witnesses in the 
production of human rights evidence.  Of course, a greater volume and variety of 
information from unknown and untrained sources creates problems of 
misinformation and verification, which technology only goes so far to mitigate.  In 
terms of advocacy, ICTs provide new channels for quickly and visibly mobilizing 
publics, for directly engaging with advocacy targets, and for spreading awareness of 
human rights.  The effects of these new advocacy channels are unclear, however, 
and they may imperil categories of human rights and the reputations of human 
rights organizations. 
The opportunities outlined here are a cause for optimism, but the risks show that 
the use of ICTs should be approached with an abundance of caution and an 
understanding of context – and that the best decision on the ground may be to not 
use them at all.  In any case, their adoption should be evaluated for opportunities 
and risks not only against existing practices, but also in terms of how and why these 
opportunities and risks are distributed.  Given this report’s mandate to map the 
terrain, it has focused on identifying the opportunities and risks of categories of ICT 
initiatives and trends.  A full understanding of the topic should not, however, stop at 
this first stage of research.  A fruitful second stage of research involves considering 
how digital divides differentially distribute the benefits of the opportunities and the 
burdens of the risks among populations.  A beneficial third stage requires examining 
how the political economy of initiatives and their contexts can inflect the extent and 
the distribution of both digital divides and ICTs’ risks and opportunities in human 
rights practice.  It is worth taking a moment here to outline both of these research 
stages in more detail. 
ICTs and digital divides 
The concept of the digital divide refers to the distinction between those who do and 
those who do not have access to new ICTs; more recently, it also refers to those who 
do and those who do not have the digital literacy necessary to take advantage of 
new ICTs.192  So far in this report, we have outlined many of the opportunities and 
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risks related to the use of ICTs in the core human rights practices of prevention, fact-
finding, and advocacy.  Digital divides impact who benefits from these opportunities 
and who suffers from these risks.  On the one hand, ICTs can facilitate the pluralism 
of human rights practice, namely the volume and variety of voices involved, 
particularly in terms of amateurs and closed contexts.  This is a shift that is in line 
with the inclusive ethos of human rights.193  On the other hand, new digital 
initiatives create new lines of inclusion and exclusion inflected by access to and 
knowledge of technologies.  These lines often correspond with other registers of 
access to resources and power. 
This is evident in identifying who can and cannot benefit from the digitally-enabled 
prevention initiatives outlined earlier.  To gain from these, human rights 
practitioners need to know about the risks of ICTs and how to protect themselves.  In 
the context of optimism among human right practitioners about the benefits of ICTs, 
risks may not get the attention they deserve.  As a practitioner at an organization 
that trains other defenders on digital security told me: ‘A lot of them don’t know 
that Facebook is where a lot of people who would target human rights defenders go 
shopping.’  Police body-worn cameras may be effective for reducing the violence in 
police-civilian interactions, but the livestream documentation that is part of their 
effectiveness may not work exactly where it is most needed.  Low-income areas in 
Brazil, for example, tend to be where issues of patchy mobile coverage are 
concentrated.194   
In terms of fact-finding, social media has created a wealth of opportunities for 
civilians to speak on situations of human rights violations they have witnessed.  
Pluralism is not just about speaking, however, but also about being heard.195  Being 
heard by a human rights fact-finder often depends on one’s ability to produce 
verifiable information, which is facilitated by having a well-networked digital 
footprint and strong digital verification literacy.  Verification thus may be a barrier 
for less-resourced civilian witnesses to accessing human rights accountability.196  The 
standardization of the ‘eyewitness mode’ referenced above holds promise in part 
because it requires so little expertise from civilian witnesses.  That said, even this 
option for reporting violations excludes those who are not online.  Digital divides 
exist not only among civilian witnesses, but also among human rights fact-finders; 
the increasing necessity of technological expertise for information forensics is 
consolidating that expertise among the well-funded Western NGOs.197   
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ICTs can enable a greater variety and volume of voices in human rights advocacy, in 
part because of the ease with which digitally-endowed and digitally-literate publics 
can show their support for particular causes.   The promotion of human rights using 
ICTs may indeed contribute to a culture of awareness, but if promotion resources for 
these initiatives are diverted away from more traditional channels, this is to the 
detriment of vulnerable groups who are not online.  Furthermore, as with fact-
finding, not all voices in online advocacy are heard equally – not just because of 
digital divides, but also more generally because of access to resources and power.  
For example, optimism about ICTs levelling the public sphere playing field would 
indicate that smaller human rights NGOs would gain voice vis-à-vis larger ones, and 
that human rights NGOs as a category would gain vis-à-vis more powerful sectors.  A 
recent study, however, found that, of 257 sampled human rights NGOs, 10 percent 
had 92 percent of the group’s total Twitter followers, 90 percent of the group’s 
views on YouTube, and 81 percent of their likes on Facebook.  Clearly, the rise of 
ICTs has not re-distributed attention between NGOs.  Nor, the study found, has it 
helped NGOs set the agenda in the mainstream media.198  
Digital divides cut through populations all over the map based on all kinds of 
characteristics.  Language is one of them.  Apps are often written and coded in 
English, and the emphasis on the written word in the design of ICTs disadvantages 
oral cultures.199  Furthermore, access to technology may be embedded in power 
relations at the local level, such as according to gender and position within the social 
hierarchy.200  It may also play into power relations on a larger scale, at the levels of 
urban versus rural, educated versus uneducated, and wealthy versus poor.201  These 
digital divides shape the distribution of opportunities and risks in the use of ICTs in 
human rights practice.  Digital divides, in turn, are delineated by power relations 
related to the production and use of technology.   
The political economy of ICTs 
Understanding the political economy of a practice or resource means understanding 
the power relations that shape that practice or resource.202  In the case of ICTs 
relevant to human rights, we can examine, among other aspects, the ownership and 
control of these ICTs.  Those who own and control ICTs set the parameters for the 
opportunities these ICTs afford for human rights practices and the risks they present; 
they also contribute to the contours of digital divides.  Because of the oft-significant 
costs of developing and building ICTs, they tend to be owned and therefore 
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controlled by commercial players or states.  These entities’ incentives are not 
necessarily aligned with those of the human rights community.  HRDs have thus also 
struck out on their own to create ICTs with support from funders and developers. 
This does not mean that collaborations and conversations between technology 
companies and the human rights community have not been fruitful; YouTube 
installed its face blurring tool, for example, following advocacy by Witness.203  
Companies have their own prerogatives, however, not least of which are their 
commercial goals.  These prerogatives may cause companies to regulate or change 
the platforms and applications on which the human rights community depends.204  
As mentioned, social media companies may remove posts documenting violations in 
response to political pressure or because they contravene community standards 
about graphic content.205  In another example, core to the business model of a 
number of technology companies that trade in information are the algorithms that 
sift that data.  In part because of their commercial value, the workings of these 
algorithms are often opaque – yet they can have tremendous impact on what is 
seen, heard, and read in the public sphere.206  This has implications for human rights 
advocacy, as these algorithms influence its visibility.  Algorithms may also affect the 
nature of human rights advocacy if HRDs alter advocacy’s content and style based on 
what they anticipate that algorithms reward.207  It is no wonder that a push for 
algorithmic accountability is gathering steam amongst the academic and journalistic 
communities.208 
State control of ICTs may be a function of ownership, but it also may be a function of 
regulation or repression.  Sometimes this is outright, as in the recent allegations of 
government shutdowns of the internet in Libya, Egypt and Syria.209  Alternatively, 
states can use their ability to block websites to pressure social media companies to 
censor particular content.210  China’s extensive and complex system of censorship, 
known colloquially as the Great Firewall of China, does indeed block externally-
owned commercial social media, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.  Sina 
Weibo, a Chinese social media company that requires users to register with their real 
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names, is a popular alternative, but is heavily monitored, censored, and flush with 
state propaganda.211  Furthermore, states such as the U.S. and the U.K. have a 
history of pushing technology companies to build backdoor access into encryption 
technologies for them.212 
The third sector also exerts a measure of control on ICTs used in human rights work, 
whether through design, funding, or donations in kind.  On the one hand, this can 
allow the human rights community more autonomy to develop and deploy – and 
possibly even to commercialize – ICTs, as evidenced by existing collaborations with 
ICT specialists such as those undertaken by HURIDOCS.213  On the other hand, this 
can tie HRDs’ hands, as when donors are more interested in funding the technology 
than the training, creating risks for untrained users.214  As with ICT4D (ICTs for 
development) projects, which have been criticised for imposing Northern ideas on 
Southern peoples, ICT4HR projects are much improved through a critical-reflexive 
examination of the power relations they themselves may draw upon and 
generate.215  This examination should form part of the research that developers and 
users of ICTs in the human rights space should undertake as part of their due 
diligence in the name of human rights. 
ICTs create opportunities for human rights work beyond those outlined in this 
report, including coordinating work, crowdsourcing solutions to human rights issues, 
gathering opinions on the priorities of human rights practice, and facilitating extra-
institutional civilian fact-finding.216  The future no doubt imminently heralds new 
applications, and this report is therefore accompanied by a student run blog, 
ictandhr.tumblr.com, that welcomes submissions.  The sum of these digitally-
enabled opportunities for pluralism increases ‘social accountability,’ or the 
mechanisms that a citizen has to hold her government to account – that is, a citizen 
with the literacy, time, and money to engage with ICTs.217  
Going forward, research should build on this report’s development of the first stage 
of the research framework for approaching ICTs and human rights practice to delve 
further into stages two and three.  For example, a fuller understanding of the 
political economy of an ICT and its use would involve understanding not only 
economic and political ownership and control, but also power relations within the 
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culture and the social organization of relevant practices and institutions.218  Beyond 
presenting a fuller picture, approaching ICTs through this framework sets 
researchers and practitioners on a pathway to action.  Exposing digital divides can 
lower barriers to pluralism, which researching the political economy leading to these 
digital divides can shed light on abuses of power; both of these actions are core 
goals of the human rights community.  Critical and reflexive ICT design, policy-
making, and awareness-raising thus have the potential to further ICTs’ contributions 
to human rights on the ground as well as in spirit.  
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